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ABSTRACT
________________________________________________________________
Taking as its start-point a radical intervention in the field of archaeology
and heritage—one that laid down a direct challenge to the unspoken
discourse of property relations inherent in our management of cultural
resources—this article considers how much has changed since that
intervention. In particular, the article considers developments in the manner
of legal regulation of archaeological heritage, the adoption of ideas from
economics, and relations with communities that have taken place in
archaeology. It identifies differences between the rhetoric of commentators
and practitioners and their actual practice that we need to address if we
seek truly to turn our field into one that serves the wider community rather
than merely telling others how to be.
________________________________________________________________
Re´sume´: En partant d’une intervention radicale dans le domaine de
l’arche´ologie et du patrimoine, une intervention qui contredit directement
le discours tacite des rapports patrimoniaux inhe´rents a` la fac¸on dont nous
ge´rons les ressources culturelles, le pre´sent article mesure les changements
survenus depuis. Il tient pre´cise´ment compte des de´veloppements observe´s
dans le champ des re`glements juridiques en matie`re de patrimoine
arche´ologique, de l’adoption de concepts e´conomiques et des rapports
avec les communaute´s dans le contexte de l’arche´ologie. L’article identifie
des diffe´rences entre la rhe´torique des commentateurs et des praticiens et
leur pratique re´elle en soulevant la ne´cessite´ de les adresser si nous
cherchons vraiment a` mettre notre discipline au service de la communaute´
globale au lieu de dicter de simples fac¸ons d’eˆtre.________________________________________________________________
Resumen: Tomando como punto de partida una intervencio´n radical en el
campo de la arqueologı´a y del patrimonio, la que planteo´ un desafı´o
directo al discurso ta´cito de las relaciones de propiedad inherentes a
nuestra gestio´n de los recursos culturales, este artı´culo considera cua´nto ha
cambiado desde esa intervencio´n. En particular, el artı´culo considera los
cambios en la regulacio´n legal del patrimonio arqueolo´gico, la adopcio´n de
ideas de economı´a y las relaciones con las comunidades que han ocurrido
en la arqueologı´a. Identifica diferencias entre la reto´rica de los
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comentaristas y de los profesionales y su pra´ctica real, lo que debemos
abordar si realmente queremos convertir a nuestro campo en uno que sirva
a la comunidad en general, en lugar de simplemente decirles a los dema´s
co´mo deben ser.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Cultural property, Ownership, Law, Economics’ community
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Introduction
The book Against Cultural Property (Carman 2005a) examined the role of
property relations in respect of the cultural heritage. It did so by focusing
on the property half of the ‘cultural property’ equation, which has been the
part conventionally omitted in discussions of cultural property which lar-
gely focus on justifying the designation of such material as cultural (see eg.
Greenfield 1989, 252–255) or providing challenges to private ownership
(see eg. Rowlands 2004; Brown 2003). Drawing on a longstanding interest
in issues of value (as reflected in Carman 1990, 1995, 1996a, b, 1998, 1999,
2000, 2005b, 2009, 2010a, b) and preliminary statements on the conse-
quences for heritage of ownership made elsewhere (Carman 2002, 195–
199), the book was based on the following principles:
(a) That the discourse of ‘stewardship’ and ‘custodianship’ that domi-
nates the field of heritage masks a different reality, in particular that
institutions responsible for the heritage exercise rights of ownership;
(b) That insofar as issues of property are included in the heritage dis-
course, it is limited to debates concerning only two alternatives: pri-
vate ownership and state ownership, both of which are by their
nature exclusionary and authoritarian rather than inclusive and per-
missive; they collapse to a power to exclude others from access;
(c) That this is a limiting discourse because it ignores alternatives that
may be better suited to the heritage which is claimed by the rhetoric
of the field to be a communal property, and it is on behalf of those
communities that heritage institutions and managers claim to act.
Accordingly, the book sought to examine those alternative forms of
property relation—especially communal property and ‘open access’ or
non-property—as alternative approaches to the management of our her-
itage. In terms of communal property, the book drew on ideas from insti-
tutional economics (Eggertsson 1990; but especially Ostrom 1990) that
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identified the means by which successful communal property regimes oper-
ated, and the mechanisms in place to ensure their success. These were then
compared with a number of community projects in archaeology from
around the globe, and it was found that successful community archaeology
projects operated in exactly the same way. In other words, there was no
need to invent a new way of managing heritage places to match the rheto-
ric of communal ownership to heritage practice, but merely to recognise
the need to operate heritage management as a community project and to
apply mechanisms already tested and proved in other contexts.
In terms of open access regimes, the book drew on models of voluntary
restraint, especially anarchist approaches to ownership (eg. Kropotkin
1972), the international treaties regulating use of Antarctica and Outer
Space (UN 1961, 1967) and especially ideas about ‘cognitive ownership’
(Boyd et al. 2005, 2012). The latter derive from experiences in Australia
where very diverse communities each lay claim to particular places but in a
non-exclusive manner so that each can take from it as they choose so long
as this does not affect the use by another; the outcome is overlapping and
complementary sets of divergent interests who collectively serve to protect
and preserve their heritage despite their differences. The experience also
emphasises the role of scholars in creating the value that is recognised by
these communities of stakeholders and thereby the communities themselves
(see also Carman 2011; McGhee 2012). Such notions—grounded in practi-
cal experience—are in direct contrast to the mobilisation of ideas concern-
ing ‘the tragedy of the commons’ more frequently encountered in
discussions by heritage managers on behalf of their institutions which are
utilised to justify the close regulation of heritage (eg. Thurley 2014).
Despite the reasonably wide citation of the book since its publication, it
remains difficult to shift us from the idea that protection of material from
the past requires regulation and imposed systems of control. A talk given
in Sweden included a discussion of the ‘cognitive ownership’ idea as an
alternative to current regimes of heritage management. The talk was kindly
tweeted to a wider audience by a colleague, and questions from online ‘lis-
teners’ passed to me as part of the discussion after the speech was com-
pleted. Such a listener enquired if there was any ‘‘legal basis’’ for the idea
and how it could be applied without legislation. The answer of course is
that it has no legal basis: by definition, it is an alternative to regulation,
not a product of—or can be made subject to—law. The idea that ‘‘heritage
is [inevitably] governed by legislation’’ (Cleere 1989, 10) therefore persists,
even when discussion turns to alternatives that challenge the very basis of
categorising cultural objects and places as any form of ‘property’. Therein
lies the continuing problem that is at the heart of heritage practices: as put
in Against Cultural Property, ‘‘it is the notion of ownership itself which is
the problem in our treatment of ancient remains’’ (Carman 2005a, 28).
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Law and Ownership: A Link Unbroken
The earliest laws to affect what we now recognise as ‘cultural prop-
erty’—promulgated by Popes in the 14th and 15th centuries—were all
about establishing rights of ownership and control but not of the material
as especially ‘cultural’. Instead, the stones of Roman ruins were seen as a
resource for building purposes, and the laws simply reserved their use to
the Pope and his agents (see Carman 2012, 16). Later rival Danish and
Swedish royal initiatives sought to locate ancient remains within develop-
ing proto-national narratives and thus declared them property of the
respective crowns (Carman 2012, 18), while the emergence of the newly
independent and unified states of Greece and Italy in the 19th century saw
the invention of the idea of heritage as a national patrimony (Carman
2012, 20–23), an idea that has since spread across the world. The link
between regulation and ownership is both close and indissoluble: to regu-
late cultural heritage is to declare a claim of ownership, and a claim of
ownership requires regulation to enforce it. While there are multiple forms
of control available to be applied to heritage (O’Keefe and Prott 1984,
191), the fact of regulation establishes that claim of ownership. This ‘na-
tionalisation’ of the cultural heritage has a number of advantages:
• it is a coherent and transparent process applied equally to all;
• it ensures full control by appropriate agencies over the fate of mate-
rial;
• it associates such material with the entire community as represented
by the nation state; and
• it is simple to understand.
However, it remains a claim of ownership and is therefore in defiance
of the principle that heritage is managed on behalf of the community (how-
ever defined) that is its true owner.
It is a widespread and common claim made by agencies of all
kinds—national agencies, museums, independent trusts, and others—that
they do not own the material for which they are responsible but merely act
as stewards for a wider community. That wider community may be limited
to a list of ‘stakeholders’ who are deemed to have a direct interest in the
material which is being held on their behalf, but specific identification of
such interests can be difficult and any such list will include not only differ-
ing kinds of interests, but also those that conflict (eg. Carman 2005a, 83–
85; Groarke and Warrick 2006, 164–167). One alternative is a vague for-
mulation such as ‘the common heritage of [hu]mankind’ which, as Dingli
(2006) argues, has a number of advantages:
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• It distributes responsibility globally;
• It recognises the global and local nature of archaeology;
• It emphasises its role in enhancing the quality of life; and
• It removes heritage from the realm of narrow interests and political
decision-making.
As emphasised by a number of commentators (eg. Askew 2010; Omland
2006), however, the idea of ‘global’ interest collapses to the concerns of
particular interests, especially that of nation states because they are the
agencies most able to claim the ability to act in the name of collectivities,
and the institution generally granted the legitimacy to do so (Green 1990).
Other alternatives (conveniently outlined in Young 2006, 15–16) are own-
ership by individuals, by cultures, and by the nation (defined not as the
state but as a community of people). While Young (2006) is specifically
concerned to examine the claim of cultural ownership—and the difficulties
that arise of defining a specific ‘culture’ and is membership—Leaman
(2006) in the same volume (Scarre and Scarre 2006) examine the ethics of
collecting and the care for the collected material that is implied by the act
of possession. On a broader note, Groarke and Warrick (2006) examine
the specific injunction placed upon members of the Society for American
Archaeology to promote and practice ‘‘stewardship of the archaeological
record’’ (SAA 2000). They suggest this vague formulation, which does not
specify on whose behalf archaeologists are acting, should be replaced by a
form of words that focuses on the relationships of archaeologists with
those whose their work affects and recognises the authority of others to
regulate archaeology in others’ interests (Groarke and Warrick 2006, 176).
They suggest this definition of what stewardship means—not control over
material, but a recognition of the duties owed to others—should be paired
with an obligation to ‘‘act in a way that adheres to reasonable standards of
research and investigation’’ (Groarke and Warrick 2006, 177) and that this
will override any particular duty to any specific interest group.
The idea that heritage managers act towards the heritage as stewards on
behalf of others has its attractions, in particular that it gives reason to deny
any claims of exclusive ownership. However, as Groarke and Warrick
(2006) and Smith and Waterton (2009) both make clear in their discus-
sions of how heritage managers interact with the world beyond them, her-
itage managers also constitute a community with interests of its own. As
Zimmerman (1998, 2000, 72) has pointed out in the case of managing
archaeological remains, the appointment of archaeologists as stewards of
their material assumes that only they have valid expertise to deal with such
material, thus privileging a particular form of professional knowledge and
giving authority to it. In this sense, archaeologists are agents of what Smith
has termed the ‘authorised heritage discourse’ (Smith 2006)—indeed the
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primary agents (Smith and Waterton 2009, 43)—which serves effectively to
deny to those for whom archaeologists notionally work direct access and
knowledge of their own pasts. Accordingly, the idea of ‘stewardship’ or
‘custodianship’ of the past is in essence a lie: it serves to mask the fact of
effective control over the material and—more crucially—the meanings of
the past, limiting them to those sanctioned by professional consensus. The
practical and material expression of this control is represented by the vari-
ous means employed to preserve the past, all of which directly involve and
indeed depend upon heritage managers.
The point about the relationship of law to ownership came briefly to
the fore in England in 1989, on the discovery as a result of building work
of the remains of Shakespeare’s first custom-built theatre on the south
bank of the Thames in London. While it was universally agreed that the
remains were of national importance—both because of their association
with a major national figure and the rarity of remains from early the-
atres—it was disputed whether the remains should be preserved under the
legal provisions allowing this, or buried under the development. Preserva-
tion would have required the payment to the developer of a huge amount
in compensation, and the then government was unwilling to do this, in
part because of the precedent it would set. Activists urging preservation
took the matter to court to force the issue, but the judge refused to rule in
their favour: citing the legislation, he pointed out that the law did not
require the preservation of sites of national importance, but merely
empowered the relevant government minister to do so at discretion. Fur-
thermore, although ‘public interest’ was a factor to be taken into account
in such cases, ‘‘the ordinary citizen does not have sufficient interest’’ to
provide them with legal standing in challenging such decisions. In other
words, so far as the law is concerned, individual citizens have no direct
interest in ‘national’ property: all rights belong to the State and its agents
as distinct from the citizenry (Carman 1996a, 146–148).
Elsewhere (Carman 2002, 194–199, 2005a, 73–77) in developing that
argument, I have considered how state ownership of heritage constitutes an
appropriation of that material for the benefit of the state as an institution.
This is in part a critique of the nation state as a dominant political form:
the state subsumes all its population into a single category of ‘citizen’,
thereby eroding cultural variety. The same is true in respect of material
that is the heritage of particular groups: Aranda (2010) makes it clear how
state ownership in Mexico, exercised by the agency of INAH (the Mexican
National Institute of Anthropology and History), denies Indigenous com-
munities access to or control over material that they consider to be ances-
tral. State ownership of material in Mexico—as elsewhere—is seen as a
hindrance to commercial development, and so the discovery of objects or
sites goes unreported to the authorities as required by law; while some
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communities take action to protect such material and are recognised by
staff of INAH as their allies in preserving Mexico’s past, the communities
are rarely involved in future decision-making or gain any benefits and may
see the material they have cared for removed to a distant location (Aranda
2010). In a contrasting example, however, Nuttall (1997, 233) reports on
how Indigenous Alaskan people are using ownership of their cultural her-
itage to develop a tourist industry.
Economics and Ownership: A Link Weakly Forged
Against Cultural Property (Carman 2005a) made an explicit connection
between ideas from economics and the management of heritage. In partic-
ular by drawing upon economic studies of successful communal ownership
regimes carried out in other areas of the world (eg. Ostrom 1990) and
comparing this to successful ‘community’ archaeology projects, a model of
their application to heritage more generally was derived. The idea was in
part to encourage economists and students of heritage to draw upon each
other’s knowledge and experience for the benefit of both (ideas since devel-
oped in Carman 2014; forthcoming). While ideas from economics have
since found their way into the discourse of heritage, it has not been with a
view to develop new ways of understanding heritage, nor to challenge con-
ventional management strategies. Instead, it has been a rather conservative
set of interventions concerning the measurement of the values accruing to
and from heritage.
The approach of economists to heritage often takes a very particular
stance. In 2005, for instance, the UK-based environmental economics con-
sultancy group eftec published a report for a number of British heritage
agencies on The Valuation of the Historic Environment that advocated the
view that ‘‘heritage assets’’ are inevitably economic phenomena because
they provided ‘‘flows of wellbeing’’ (Eftec 2005, 7) and are therefore amen-
able to analysis from an economic perspective. Works such as Throsby’s
(2001) Economics and Culture have also been taken up within the heritage
field (Clark 2006) as significant contributions to understanding the phe-
nomenon of heritage. In 2008, UK economist Alan Peacock and his Italian
colleague Ilde Rizzo published The Heritage Game in an effort to ‘‘outline
the contribution economics can make to the present public concern to
conserve… a country’s cultural patrimony’’ (Peacock and Rizzo 2008, xiii).
It is on the basis of commentators such as these that Randall Mason
(2008) based a call for conservationists to pay attention to economic ideas.
He argued for those working in ‘heritage conservation’ to take note of
ideas in the field of ‘cultural economics’ and to ‘‘[incorporate] economic
values into conservation’’ (Mason 2008, 315) in order that conservationists
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can gain a greater understanding of the place of heritage in contemporary
society.
It is interesting to see how different economists comprehend the phe-
nomenon of heritage. Essentially, there seem to be two opposed positions
available to them, depending on how they perceive the means by which
heritage objects can be considered ‘valuable’:
• that heritage objects represent economic goods like any other because
of the benefits that accrue from them and that their cultural value is
seen as the reason for ascribing them economic worth (Eftec 2005;
Peacock and Rizzo 2008);
• that heritage objects represent a store of cultural value that is different
from that of economic goods and that these value schemes operate
entirely independently (Throsby 2001; Mason 2008).
None of course deny the availability or usefulness of economic analysis
to cultural goods: it is a question of the relationship between these two
value ‘realms’ and whether the two are causally related, or quite indepen-
dent.
The interest that economists have in heritage lies in its status as a ‘pub-
lic good’. These are items that are understood not to be tradeable and
therefore can acquire no market value. They are also held to provide ‘flows
of wellbeing’ that accrue not to individuals, but to the community at large.
They are frequently also items that can be ‘consumed’ by many individuals
at the same time without diminution of the stock—a recognition that ‘her-
itage’ is an abundant phenomenon, at once local and universal. For Mason
(2008), the key ‘public good’ aspects of heritage objects are their non-
tradeability in the market and the benefits to wider society they provide.
The quantification of particular components of the heritage is the
approach advocated for so-called ‘heritage assets’ in the UK (ASB 2006),
whereby these assets would be assessed for their financial value in order
that this information could be included in the annual reports of the bodies
responsible for them—museums for their collections, heritage agencies for
sites, monuments, buildings, and so on. This approach was strongly criti-
cised on a number of grounds, some philosophical and some practical, by
academics, heritage bodies, and by accounting professionals, but neverthe-
less it remains a scheme to be implemented at some future time. The
philosophical objections have been published elsewhere (eg. Carman et al.
1999, 2005a), but practical objections focus on the precise methods of val-
uation to be applied. The most widely accepted method is that of Contin-
gent Valuation, but that too is recognised to be faulty in some respects.
Accordingly, efforts have been made to rectify the method to assure its
greater effectiveness, such as by Gibson (2011) or Klamer (2014) who
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argued for Contingent Valuation to be supplemented by a process that
records the kinds of values that accrue to stakeholders. Taking a slightly
different perspective, Carnegie and Wolnizer (1996) argued for an
approach that evaluated heritage places—especially museums—on the basis
of how well their activities reflected or contributed to achieving their
objectives as set out in their own mission statements.
It is clear that there is value in borrowing ideas from economics to
assist those of us who wish to understand the phenomenon of heritage.
Economics—as a serious and mature social science—can offer much in
making sense of the difficult concepts we encounter while trying to com-
prehend the heritage as a contemporary social fact (see the index entries
for ‘economics’ in eg. Carman 1996a, 2002, 2005a; Fairclough et al. 2008;
Sørensen and Carman 2009). In particular, as the field sine qua non of the
study of value and valuation, economics has a great deal to offer those of
us on the ‘cultural’ and more anthropological side of things to help us
grapple with the issues that interest us. We are, however, limited in the
types of value we on the ‘cultural’ side of the heritage field can apply, and
discussions of value in the field frequently collapse into one of three
modes:
• Mere description of qualities that heritage objects are deemed to pos-
sess—such as architectural or artistic merit, archaeological or histori-
cal interest, age, and condition (eg. the criteria for designating sites of
importance in the UK, DoE 1990);
• A discussion about value and what it means and perhaps derives from
(eg. Lipe 1984; Carver 1996; Carman 2002, 148–176); or
• The listing of the kinds of uses heritage objects and sites can be put
to (eg. Darvill 1995).
The limitations of economics, however, lie in the particular methods of
valuation that have been advocated. All are primarily quantitative, reducing
heritage values to amounts of currency. As mentioned above, the most
common approach to valuing heritage objects for which there is no market
value is that of Contingent Valuation. This—in essence—is a measure of
how much people are willing to pay for the maintenance or availability to
them of a resource. This has the effect of reducing the ‘public’ who are the
owners and beneficiaries of heritage to ‘consumers’ who can express prefer-
ences as to their ‘willingness to pay’ for particular sets of goods or ser-
vices—either directly or (more commonly) through some sort of taxation
(Peacock and Rizzo 2008, 125–135). It is also clear from the work of Eftec
(2005) in England that applying data from one study to a different but
apparently similar context is fraught with difficulties: therefore in order to
make meaningful value assessments for heritage objects, economists are
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forced either to carry out expensive contingent valuation studies for each
different context, or to simplify the collection of data to a few simple vari-
ables (which may never be the key variables) to allow transfer to a different
context.
In both these cases, economics and heritage studies can be seen to be
equally deficient. Economics lacks a capacity to understand and evaluate
the heritage as a cultural phenomenon. At the same time, the cultural
approach to heritage lacks a language in which to express the values the
heritage holds. By working together, such a language could be developed to
the mutual benefit of both: for economists, to gain an insight into a phe-
nomenon effectively opaque to them; for students of heritage studies, to
communicate effectively the nature of the phenomenon we struggle to
describe. At the same time, both will step outside their mutual ‘comfort
zones’. Mason (2008) rightly called for conservationists to take notice of
economics: a parallel process would call upon economists to take notice of
heritage—not as an economic phenomenon, but as a cultural one.
Community and Ownership: A Link Forged
The launch in 2014 of the Journal of Community Archaeology and Heritage
indicated the rising interest in recognising the authority and role of non-
experts in relation to heritage. This is a move away from a traditional view
that heritage professionals are acting on behalf of a wider community to
offer a ‘‘wise use of resources’’ (Bender and Smith 2000, 34) that others
cannot provide. This shift has been noted very recently by Hollowell
(2013), who commented upon several effective critiques of the stewardship
model [including that contained in Against Cultural Property (Carman
2005a, 75–76)], but noted the lack ‘‘of a reenvisioning of stewardship
among the majority of practicing archaeologists’’ in response. However,
she also noted the parallel rise of a series of alternative kinds of steward-
ship, including:
• Shared stewardship, including arrangements for co-management by
both professionals and community, and repatriation of material to
descendant communities;
• Collaborative stewardship, including active recognition of the rights
of others in relation to heritage;
• Community-based stewardship, which is collaborative stewardship,
but guided by community-identified needs;
• Knowledge stewardship, which recognises the rights of others over
certain classes of—especially ritual—knowledge;
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• Indigenous heritage stewardship, which is a specific version of com-
munity-based and knowledge stewardship, recognising the particular
status of Indigenous peoples; and
• ‘‘Deliberative democracy’’ (Shoup and Monteiro 2008, 331) which
adopts a ‘listening’ approach and a willingness to include local needs
and interests into decision-making.
All of these represent different versions of the kind of approach that
challenges the idea of cultural material as the exclusive concern of heritage
professionals and opens the door to the consideration of alternative forms
of its management. All involve the abrogation by professionals of some of
the rights of control they have traditionally exercised and treated as theirs.
The editors of the Journal of Community Archaeology and Heritage specifi-
cally make the point: ‘‘we see all community and heritage projects as…
conversations [in which participants are] engaged in a conversation from
which new ideas and even more conversation will emerge’’ (Thomas et al.
2014; emphasis in original). In such arrangements, stewardship on behalf of
others becomes a process of mutual engagement.
For these archaeologists, presenting the results of their work is central
to their purpose and so mere preservation of sites is not enough. Instead,
archaeological practice as they see it is at the service of a wider community
and a wider agenda than the mere study of the past. Here, the practice of
archaeology is itself the ‘conversation’ that is central to the interaction with
others (and see e.g. Carman 1997; Dalglish 2013; Harrison and Schofield
2010; McDavid 2009; Moshenska and Dhanjal 2011).
Issues of ownership and property relations, at least as conventionally
understood, do not arise overtly here. In treating not only archaeological
remains but also archaeological practice as a topic for debate, however,
there is an attempt at abandonment of any claim to exclusive rights taking
place, both of rights of physical control over material and of rights to
determine the very nature of one’s work. These are—although often denie-
d—in practice claims of ownership: if archaeologists are the only ones with
the right to determine what constitutes archaeological practice, they are
making a claim of ownership of archaeology as a practice in the same way
as the traditional ‘stewardship’ model makes claims over the material with
which archaeologists deal. Such notions resonate with a recent recogni-
tion—most cogently summarised by Smith and Waterton (2009)—that
heritage professionals themselves represent a community of interest, but
only one such community among the many. A recognition of others’ inter-
ests in their heritage immediately raises the issue of whether the kind of
interest that heritage professions represent should be treated as anything
different from those of other interested groups. The traditional ‘steward-
ship’ model would argue that the expertise offered by professionals would
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give them a prior role in deciding the fate of material, but critics would
counter with the argument that the material does not ultimately belong to
the professionals. This opens to direct scrutiny the claims of ownership
that lie unspoken at the heart of the stewardship model. In acknowledge-
ment of this, some recent writing (eg. Auclair and Fairclough 2015, 13)
manages address the issue while at the same time providing a justification
for the managerial status quo.
While experiments in shared responsibility and community engagement
represent developments in the region of ‘communal ownership’ explored in
Against Cultural Property (Carman 2005a, 81–99), they leave the topic of
‘open access’ unexamined. This matters because any claim that the past
‘‘belongs to all’’ (such as by Merriman 1991, 1) denies any rights of special
interest or claim. This applies as much to Indigenous or other claims of
descent, or to local associations, as it does to claims of professional exper-
tise or special knowledge. While we in the heritage field commit to such a
view, it becomes incumbent upon us to operationalise concepts such as
that of ‘cognitive ownership’ (Boyd et al. 2005, 2012). While some (eg.
Norman 2009) share my own view (Carman 2005a, 111–115) that cognitive
ownership claims inevitably imply the acceptance of reciprocal obligations
to preserve the heritage from harm, Boyd (2012, 192–193) is more scepti-
cal: he cites Norman (2009) who points out that ‘‘bureaucrats do not wel-
come the concept of ‘ownership’… they do not seem to see that with
ownership comes obligation’’. As Hollowell (2013) also points out, there is
some doubt as to what or whom duties of ‘stewardship’ are owed: if to the
material alone, then this authorises the exercise of authority; if to commu-
nities of interest, then responsibility to preserve the material takes second
place in contravention of basic disciplinary imperatives. Where profession-
als are seen as merely one community among many laying claim to cultural
material, and where all have equal rights and obligations, our power to act
is proportionately diminished.
The focus remains, however, upon obligation. The exercise of steward-
ship is in practice the exercise of authority, and discussions of obligations
towards heritage are too often confused with those of authority over her-
itage. The notion of ‘cognitive ownership’ serves to emphasise the place of
‘community’ in any consideration of heritage, since ‘‘community access to
heritage is legitimized through the recognition of interest’’ and this is all
that is required (Boyd 2012, 180). It also recognises the fluidity of commu-
nity as new cognitive owners emerge from within and without existing
communities of interest. Finally, it offers the opportunity to recognise all
those who lay claim to heritage without imposing a restriction on the type
of interest recognised or placing them in a hierarchy. The obligation is to
accord that recognition to all who require it with no restrictions.
JOHN CARMAN
Conclusion: Beyond Cultural Property
The purposes of Against Cultural Property (Carman 2005a) were to inte-
grate ideas from economics into heritage thinking, to challenge the
assumption of authority held by heritage managers, and on these bases to
promote a way forward for those involved the field of heritage. The book
was of course not alone in the first two of these aims: earlier texts had
considered heritage value from an economic perspective and continue to
do so (eg. Mason 2008; Gibson 2011; Klamer 2014); similarly, challenges to
the authority of heritage managers and assertion of community interest
also predate the book and post-date it (eg. Marshall 2002; Skeates et al.
2012). Because of these, the development of a way forward for treating the
heritage has developed not so much because of the book as in parallel with
it. The underlying aim—to expose the discourse of ownership that underlies
so much of our attitude towards heritage and its treatment—is perhaps the
one element that has not been picked up by others.
This is, however, a crucial aspect. Heritage practitioners and the theo-
rists that support heritage work lack a discourse of ownership that will
effectively counter those who make claims for the exclusive appropriation
of heritage. Our rhetoric is that heritage belongs to everyone equally, but
our practice denies this. When faced with others—such as private collec-
tors, acquisitive institutions, looters of sites and museums—we have no
answer to their claims of ownership except that we act for the collective
rights of all: but our practice in denying access to heritage material and
places offers direct proof of the falseness of this claim. There is some
recognition that we represent a particular interest group in relation to her-
itage (see eg. Smith and Waterton 2009; Groarke and Warrick 2006), but
we also need to go beyond this to refute our own claims on heritage. We
need to develop an effective response to those who make claims of owner-
ship in defiance of the universal character of heritage and to support this
in practice. This means creating a discourse of ownership that runs counter
to that of exclusivity. At present, we do not have one. The ideas contained
in Against Cultural Property were offered as a first stage in that process.
We still need to act upon them to move us beyond the damaging idea that
cultural material represents any kind of property.
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